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Abstract. Because risks are on all sides of social situations, it is not possible to be
“precautionary” in general. The availability heuristic ensures that some risks stand out as
particularly salient, whatever their actual magnitude. Taken together with intuitive costbenefit balancing, the availability heuristic helps to explain differences across groups,
cultures, and even nations in the assessment of precautions to reduce the risks associated
with climate change. There are complex links among availability, social processes for the
spreading of information, and predispositions. If the United States is to take a stronger
stand against climate change, it is likely to be a result of available incidents that seem to
show that climate change produces serious and tangible harm.

1. Introduction
“Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they
also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather
enjoy a cold drink of water after some cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments”
(Henrich et al., 2001).
“The most important factor contributing to the increased stringency of health,
safety and environmental regulation in Europe has been a series of regulatory failures and
crises that placed new regulatory issues on the political agenda and pressured policy
makers to adopt more risk averse or precautionary policies. . . . The regulatory failure
associated with BSE significantly affected the attitude of the European public toward GM
foods. . . . Consumer and environmental regulations are likely to become more
innovative, comprehensive and risk averse as a response to a widespread public
perception of regulatory failures” (Vogel, 2003).

Precautions against What?

It has become standard to say that with respect to risks, Europe and the United
States can be distinguished along a single axis: Europe accepts the Precautionary
Principle, and the United States does not. On this view, Europeans attempt to build a
“margin of safety” into public decisions, taking care to protect citizens against risks that
cannot be established with certainty. By contrast, Americans are reluctant to take
precautions, requiring clear evidence of harm in order to justify regulation. These claims
seem plausible in light of the fact that the United States appears comparatively
unconcerned about the risks associated with climate change and genetic modification of
food; in those contexts, Europeans favor precautions, whereas Americans seem to require
something akin of proof of danger. To be sure, the matter is quite different in the context
of threats to national security. For the war in Iraq, the United States (and England)
followed a kind of Precautionary Principle, whereas other nations (most notably France
and Germany) wanted clearer proof of danger. But for most threats to safety and health,
and for climate change in particular, many people believe that Europe is precautionary
and the United States is not.
But this opposition between Europe and America is false, even illusory (Wiener
and Rogers, 2002). It is simply wrong to say that Europeans are, in general, more
precautionary than Americans. As an empirical matter, neither is “more precautionary.”
Europeans are not more averse to risks than Americans. They are more averse to
particular risks, perhaps most prominently the risks associated with climate change; but
Americans have their own preoccupations as well. No nation can, even in principle,
commit itself to precaution as such (Sunstein, 2005; Sunstein 2003a). The real problem
with the Precautionary Principle, at least in its strongest forms, is that it is incoherent. It
purports to give guidance, but it fails to do so, because it condemns the very steps that it
requires. The reason is simple: Precautions always give rise to risks of their own.
As a starting point, it is reasonable to think that judgments about precautions will
be based on a form of intuitive cost-benefit balancing. If the costs of precautions are high,
they are less likely to be appealing; so too if the benefit are low. This point applies to
climate change as to all other problems, and it helps to explain the massive differences
between the United States and Europe with respect to that topic. In addition, the
availability heuristic is often the source of people’s fears about certain risks (Rohrmann
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and Renn, 2000).1 If a particular risk is cognitively “available”—both vivid and salient—
then people will have a heightened fear of the risk in question. If people in one nation
fear the risks associated with climate change, and people in another nation fear the risks
associated with terrorism, the availability heuristic is likely to be the reason. But this
point misses some complexities, about intuitive cost-benefit balancing, social influences
and cultural predispositions; I shall turn to these in due course. The availability heuristic
does not operate in a social or cultural vacuum.
In short, I suggest that cross-cultural differences in both risk perception and in
precautions are produced, in large part, by availability, which operates in the context of
social influences and intuitive attention to both costs and benefits. In the context of
climate change, many Americans believe that far more would be lost than gained by
extensive precautions; in Europe, the opposite is true. It is important, for example, that
the risks associated with climate change are not salient to most Americans; it is important
as well that efforts to control greenhouse gases would impose unusually high burdens on
the United States. These points bear directly on cross-cultural differences with respect to
climate change. If the United States will ultimately show more concern about the risks
associated with climate change, it is likely to be a product of a shift in intuitive costbenefit balancing—with available incidents, apparently linking climate change to serious
harm, playing a large role.
2. The Mirage of Precaution
Despite its formal enthusiasm for the Precautionary Principle, European nations
are not “more precautionary” than the United States. Simply as a logical matter, societies,
like individuals, cannot be highly precautionary with respect to all risks. Each society and
each person must select certain risks for special attention. In these respects, the selectivity
of precautions is not merely an empirical fact; it is a conceptual inevitability. Comparing
Europe to the United States, Wiener and Rogers (2002) demonstrate this point
empirically. In the early twenty-first century, for example, the United States appears to
1

Undoubtedly a great deal can be learned from use of the psychometric paradigm, stressed in
Rohrmann and Renn (2000, p. 17-18). I stress the availability heuristic here because of its comparative
simplicity, but the heuristic interacts in complex ways with psychometrics and with culture; I try at least to
scratch some of the surfaces.
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take a highly precautionary approach to the risks associated with abandoned hazardous
waste dumps and terrorism, but not to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks
associated with climate change, indoor air pollution, poverty, poor diet, and obesity. It
would be most valuable to attempt to see which nations are especially precautionary with
respect to which risks, and also to explore changes over time.
A nation-by-nation study commissioned by the German Federal Environmental
Agency goes so far as to conclude that there are two separate camps in the industrialized
world: “precaution countries” (Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United
States) and “protection countries” (Japan, France, and the United Kingdom) (Sand, 2000,
p. 448). But this conclusion is ludicrously implausible. The universe of risks is far too
large to permit categorizations of this kind. The most general point is that no nation is
precautionary in general and costly precautions are inevitably taken against only those
hazards that seem especially salient or insistent. The problem with the idea of precaution,
and any general Precautionary Principle, is that it wrongly suggests that nations can and
should adopt a general form of risk aversion (Sunstein, 2005).
3. The Availability Heuristic
I suggest that the Precautionary Principle becomes operational if and only if those
who apply it wear blinders—only, that is, if they focus on some aspects of the regulatory
situation but downplay or disregard others. But this suggestion simply raises an
additional question: What accounts for the particular blinders that underlie applications of
the Precautionary Principle? What people’s attention is selective, why is it selective in the
way that it is? Part of the answer, I contend, lies in an understanding of behavioral
economics and cognitive psychology, which provide important clues to cross-cultural
differences in risk perception, in a way that much bears on social judgments about
climate change. The availability heuristic is the place to start.
3.1. Availability in action. It is well-established that in thinking about risks,
people rely on certain heuristics, or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify their inquiry
(Kahneman et al., 1982). Heuristics typically work through a process of “attribute
substitution,” in which people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one
(Kahneman and Frederick, p. 53). Should we be fearful of climate change? When people
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use the availability heuristic, they assess the magnitude of risks by asking whether
examples of harm can readily be brought to mind (Tverksy and Kahneman, 2002, pp. 1114). If people can easily think of such examples, they are far more likely to be frightened
than if they cannot. The availability heuristic illuminates the operation of the
Precautionary Principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen and why others
will be neglected. The availability heuristic also tells us a great deal about differences in
risk perceptions across groups, cultures, and even nations.
For example, “a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more
numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable” (Tversky
and Kahneman, 2002, p. 11). Consider a simple study showing people a list of wellknown people of both sexes, and asking them whether the list contains more names of
women or more names of men. In lists in which the men were especially famous, people
thought that they were more names of men, whereas in lists in which the women were the
more famous, people thought that there were more names of women (Tversky and
Kahneman, 2002).
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk
that is familiar, like that associated with terrorism, will be seen as more serious than a
risk that is less familiar, like that associated with sun-bathing. But salience is important as
well. “For example, the impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of
such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local
paper” (Tversky and Kahneman, 2002). The point helps explain differences across time
and space in much risk-related behavior, including decisions to take precautions. Whether
people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences
(Slovic, 2000, p. 40). If floods have not occurred in the immediate past, people who live
on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance. In the aftermath of an
earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines steadily from that
point, as vivid memories recede. Note that the use of the availability heuristic, in these
contexts, is hardly irrational.2 Both insurance and precautionary measures can be
2

Tversky and Kahneman (1986) emphasize that the heuristics they identify “are highly economical
and usually effective,” but also that they “lead to systematic and predictable errors.” Gerd Gigerenzer,
among others, has emphasized that some heuristics can work extremely well (Gigerenzer et al., 1999;
Gigerenzer, 2000), and used this point as a rejoinder to those who stress the errors introduced by heuristics
5
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expensive, and what has happened before seems, much of the time, to be the best
available guide to what will happen again. The problem is that the availability heuristic
can lead to serious errors, in terms of both excessive fear and neglect.
What, in particular, produces availability? An intriguing essay attempts to test the
effects of ease of imagery on perceived judgments of risk (Sherman et al., 2002). The
study asked subjects to read about an illness (Hyposcenia-B) that “was becoming
increasingly prevalent” on the local campus. In one condition, the symptoms were
concrete and easy to imagine—involving muscle aches, low energy, and frequent severe
headaches. In another condition, the symptoms were vague and hard to imagine,
involving an inflamed liver, a malfunctioning nervous system, and a general sense of
disorientation. Subjects in both conditions were asked to imagine a three-week period in
which they had the disease and to write a detailed description of what they imagined.
After doing so, subjects were asked to assess, on a ten-point scale, their likelihood of
contracting the disease. The basic finding was that likelihood judgments were very
different in the two conditions, with easily-imagined symptoms making people far more
inclined to believe that they were likely to get the disease.
3.2. Availability and cross-national risk perceptions in general. The availability
heuristic helps to explains the operation of the Precautionary Principle and cross-national
differences for a simple reason: Sometimes a certain risk, said to call for precautions, is
cognitively available, whereas other risks, including those associated with regulation
itself, are not. In many cases where the Precautionary Principle seems to offer guidance,
the reason is that some of the relevant risks are available while others are barely visible.
Differences across nations, in the perception of risks, have a great deal to do with the
operation of the availability heuristic. I shall turn to climate change shortly; for the
moment, let us explore the hypothesis more generally.
The study of cross-cultural risk perceptions remains in its infancy (Renn and
Rohrmann, 2000), and hence my claim must remain only a hypothesis, one that I cannot
establish to be true. What is necessary, and what is lacking, is anything like
comprehensive information about cross-cultural risk perceptions, allowing us to test the

and biases. I do not mean to take a stand on the resulting debates. Even if many heuristics mostly work well
in daily life, a sensible government can do much better than to rely on them.
6
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role of availability. And we shall shortly see some complexities that bear on the adequacy
of the availability hypothesis. But for now, consider some supportive evidence:
•

Within the United States, public concern about risks usually does track changes in
the actual fluctuations in those risks. But public concern outruns actual
fluctuations in the important case of “panics,” bred by vivid illustrations that do
not reflect changes in levels of danger (Loewenstein and Mather, 1990). At
certain points in the 1970s and 1980s, there were extreme leaps in concern about
teenage suicides, herpes, illegitimacy, and AIDS—leaps that did not correspond
to changes in the size of the problem. Availability, produced by “a particularly
vivid case or new finding that receives considerable media attention,” played a
major role in those leaps in public concern (Loewenstein and Mather, 1990, p.
172). Sometimes the concern led to unjustified precautions, as in the behavior of
some parents who refused to allow their children to attend classes having students
with signs of herpes.

•

What accounts for people’s perception of their risk of being infected with HIV?
Why are some people and some groups largely unconcerned about that risk, while
other people and groups are highly focused on with it? A study of rural Kenya and
Malawi suggests that availability plays a critical role (Behrman et al., 2003). The
authors find that risk perception is a product of discussions that “are often
provoked by observing or hearing about an illness or death” (Behrman et al.,
2003, p. 10) People “know in the abstract how HIV is transmitted and how it can
be prevented,” but they are unclear “about the advisability and effectiveness of
the changes in sexual behavior that are recommended by experts” (Behrman et al.,
2003, p. 18). Perceptions of the risk of HIV transition are very much a function of
social networks, with pronounced changes in belief and behavior resulting from
interactions with other people expressing a high level of concern. The effects of
social networks are thus asymmetric, with substantial effects from having “at least
one network partner who is perceived to have a great deal of concern about
AIDS.” The authors do not refer explicitly to the availability heuristic, but their
findings are compatible with the suggestion that with respect to AIDS, risk
perceptions are produced by availability.
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•

What accounts for the recent rise of precautionary thinking in Europe? Why have
certain environmental and health risk achieved so much salience in England,
France, and the European Union generally? A comprehensive study suggests that
a few readily available incidents played a large role (Vogel, 2003). In the 1990s, a
“wave of crises” involving food safety, above all mad cow disease, led to the
deaths of about one hundred people, with especially large effects on public
attitudes (Vogel, 2003, p. 568-569). In a tribute to the operation of availability,
the “regulatory failure associated with BSE significantly affected the attitude of
the European public toward GM foods” (Vogel, 2003, p. 569). An additional
“scandal was the apparent failure of French government officials and doctors to
protect haemopholiacs from blood contaminated with AIDS” virus, in a way that
had large repercussions for public opinion in France (Vogel, 2003, p. 570-571).
The conclusion is that differences between European and American policies are
not a product of deep-rooted cultural differences, but instead have a great deal to
do with “widespread public perception of regulatory failures,” often based on
particular, vivid, and widely salient events (Vogel, 2003, p. 580).
5.3. Availability, climate change, catastrophe, and long-term risks. These points

have particular implications for risks from climate change that, by their very nature, are
not likely to cause serious harms in the near future. The problem, a serious one, is that
such harms will not be cognitively available to citizens, at least not ordinarily. People
will not “see” those harms until it is too late. In this way, the availability heuristic tends
to help explain high discount rates, by which people do not take preventive action against
even serious harms that will not come about for many years. For potentially catastrophic
risks whose prevention requires long-term investment, there are built-in obstacles to
serious regulatory efforts. If salient events, such as hurricane activity, can be associated
with climate change, the likelihood of a response is increased. But for most people most
of the time, these associations seem speculative.
A real puzzle, in this light, is not that the United States is relatively unconcerned
with climate change; it is that European nations are so willing to take action to combat it.
How do we explain this puzzle? I suggest that the availability heuristic operates as an
important “input” into a form of intuitive cost-benefit balancing, and that when the
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balance favors regulation, people will seek regulatory solutions even if social harms are
not clearly “available.” The availability heuristic does help people to assess the
magnitude of a risk; people’s judgments about magnitude are greatly affected by use of
the availability heuristic. But availability is not the only factor. If the costs of reducing
the risk are also “on screen,” and if they seem high, then people will not be so
enthusiastic about extensive precautions. In the United States, intuitive cost-benefit
balancing, done with the assistance of the availability heuristic, does not clearly support
significant precautions. For Europe, exactly the opposite is true.
Of course cost-benefit analysis is often done by technocrats in and out of
government, usually without close reference to the availability heuristic. But for both
intuitive and expert practitioners of cost-benefit analysis, the evaluation of global
warming is very different in the United States from what it is in Europe.
The crucial point here is that the United States appears to stand to lose much more
from aggressive regulation than European nation do. For the United States, the likely
costs of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, seem to exceed its likely benefits, at least on
the latest numbers (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003, p. 161). The picture for the world as a
whole is far more mixed, with Europe anticipated to be a net gainer, and with Russia
likely to gain an especially large amount (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003, p. 162). Hence
those nations that favor aggressive controls on greenhouse gases are responding in large
part to the fact that they are likely to gain more than they lose. In such circumstances,
regulation will seem attractive if the risks of climate change are even mildly “available”
to leaders and citizens. Compare in this regard the assessment of ozone depletion. In the
end, the United States was highly supportive of extensive precautions, largely because a
study from the Council of Economic Advisers suggested that the benefits of precautions,
for Americans, greatly outweighed the costs. The reason for this conclusion is that
reductions in skin cancer and cataracts, once monetized, suggested that the decreasing
costs of precaution would be well-justified. Hence President Reagan himself, no
enthusiast for extensive regulation, strongly supported American involvement in the
Montreal Protocol.
If the costs of reducing greenhouse gases were perceived as very low, the
likelihood of American involvement in precautionary efforts would dramatically
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increase; so too if it were generally perceived that the United States had a great deal to
gain from such reductions. But at the present time, many people believe that the United
States will be able to handle the costs of climate change, and hence that expensive
precautions are hard to justify simply from the standpoint of national self-interest. If this
is so, then intuitive cost-benefit balancing, undertaken without readily available incidents
of harm, is the source of the official position of the United States; it also helps to explain
Europe’s greater willingness to engage in precautionary measures.
Consider the recorded views of Americans about environmental protection and
climate change in the late 1990s. About 63 percent of Americans agreed with the
following statement: “Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and
standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental improvements must be made
regardless of cost.”3 In the same general vein, 59 percent supported the Kyoto Treaty on
global warming, with only 21 percent opposed. But in the same period, 52 percent of
Americans said that they would refuse to support the Kyoto Treaty on global warming if
“it would cost an extra $50 per month for an average American household.” In fact only
11 percent of Americans would support the Kyoto Treaty if the monthly expense were
$100 or more. How can we explain strong majority support for “environmental
improvements . . . regardless of cost” and strong majority rejection of environmental
improvements when the cost is high? The answer lies in the fact that people are not, in
fact, willing to spend an infinite amount for environmental improvements. When the
costs are squarely placed “on screen,” people begin to weigh both costs and benefits.
Surveys in Europe suggests that significant numbers of citizens there are willing to pay a
considerable amount to reduce the risks of global warming; but even there, the amount is
not extremely high (Viscusi and Hirsch, 2005). For citizens as well as leaders, intuitive
assessment of costs and benefits plays a large role in determining the level of precautions
actually sought.
But let us simply stipulate (without arguing) that the United States ought to be
doing more to control greenhouse gases than it is currently willing to do. If so, what can
be done by way of response? A clue comes from President Bush’s efforts to activate
3

See The Program on International Policy Attitudes, Americans on the Global Warming Treaty,
available at
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/GlobalWarming/glob_warm_treaty.html at Box 15.
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public concern about the catastrophic risks associated with terrorism: Conjure up vivid
images of what might happen when the relevant risks come to fruition. In this way, the
availability heuristic might be enlisted on behalf of regulatory controls. In connection
with the Iraq war, the Patriot Act, and many other terrorism-related initiatives, vivid
images of the Sept. 11 attacks helped to ensure that Americans would be willing to
“invest” in initiatives that would cost a great deal. Of course it is true that the most
serious harms associated with climate change are not likely to occur in the near-term, a
contrast with the risks of terrorism, where a catastrophe could be around the corner.
This fact makes it difficult to capture people’s attention with vivid images of
harm—difficult, but not impossible, at least if those images are combined with moral
appeals (involving obligations to future generations, whose members can be concrete, as
in, “your children and your grandchildren”) and with efforts to quell fears about the high
costs of regulatory controls. In other words, availability and salience are a promising way
of promoting public attention to risks that will not materialize for a long time. If current
hurricane activity can be associated with climate change, citizens and officials will be
more likely to favor aggressive action. To see this point, it is necessary to shift from
individual judgments to social ones.
4. Social Influences
Thus far my emphasis has been on individual cognition. But to say the least, the
availability heuristic does not operate in a social vacuum. What is readily “available” to
some individuals, groups, cultures, and nations will not be available to all. In the context
of climate change, environmentalists, in and out of government, often attempt to focus
public attention on potentially catastrophic harms. Well-organized private groups play a
central role in activating public concern. The “social amplification of risk” is a wellknown phenomenon (Pigeon et al., 2003). When social amplification occurs, it is often a
result of the availability heuristic, operating alongside social processes.
The question suggests the need to attend to the social and cultural dimensions of
fear and risk perception. In many cases of high-visibility, low-probability dangers, the
sources of availability are not obscure. The mass media focus on those risks; people
communicate their fear and concern to one another; the widespread fact of fear and
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concern increases media attention; and the spiral continues until people move on. Hence
the “risk of the month” syndrome, familiar in many societies, stems from the interaction
between availability and social influences. Much of the time, however, what is available
and salient to some is not available and salient to all.
In any case people and cultures have different predispositions. These
predispositions play a large role in determining which, of the numerous possibilities, is
salient. Those who are predisposed to believe that most media scares are false or
trumped-up will find cases in which public fears have been proved baseless. This is an
example of an individual predispositions, but undoubtedly cultural forces, some deep and
some less so, help account for differences across nations. Availability helps to determine
beliefs, to be sure; but beliefs help to determine availability as well. Both beliefs and
availability are endogenous to one another. When social and cultural forces interact with
salience, to produce concern about one set of problems but not another, predispositions
are crucial. Fears about the risks of climate change, and dismissal of those fears, can both
be explained in this way. It is in this sense that availability can be a product of forces that
must be explained independently. But let us now turn to how availability spreads.

5. Cascades
Sometimes availability and salience are produced through social bandwagons or
cascades, in which apparently representative anecdotes and gripping examples move
rapidly from one person to another (Heath et al., 2001; Heath, 1996). Consider a stylized
example. Andrew hears of a dangerous event, which he finds to be revealing or
illustrative. (The event might involve a harmful effect produced by climate change.)
Andrew tells Barry, who would be inclined to see the event as not terribly informative,
but who, learning Andrew’s reaction, comes to believe that the event does indeed reveal a
great deal, and that a serious threat exists. Carol would tend to discount the risk, but once
she hears the shared opinion of Andrew and Barry, she is frightened as well. Deborah
will have to have a great deal of private information to reject what has become the shared
opinion of Andrew, Barry, and Carol (Hirschleifer, 1995, p. 193-194). Stylized though it
is, the example shows that once several people start to take an example as probative,
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many people may come to be influenced by their opinion, giving rise to cascade effects.
Cultural and even national differences can be explained partly in this way.
A distinctive feature of social cascades is that the people who participate in them
are simultaneously amplifying the very social signal by which they are being influenced.
By their very participation, those who join the cascade increase its size, making it more
likely that others will join too.
In the domain of risks and precautions, “availability cascades” are responsible for
many social beliefs (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). A salient event, affecting people because
it is available, tends to be repeated, leading to cascade effects, as the event becomes
available to increasingly large numbers of people. The point is amplified by the fact that
fear-inducing accounts, with high emotional valence, are especially likely to spread
(Heath et al., 2001). There is a general implication here. Because different social
influences can be found in different communities, local variations are inevitable, with
different examples becoming salient in each. Hence such variations—between say
England and the United States, or between Germany and France—might involve
coincidence or small or random factors, rather than large-scale cultural differences.
Different judgments within different social groups, with different “available” examples,
owe their origin to social processes of this sort. Return to my epigraph: “Many Germans
believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they also believe that putting
ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather enjoy a cold drink of water
after some cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments” (Henrich et al., 2001, p. 353354).
6. Group Polarization
There is a closely related phenomenon. When like-minded people deliberate with
one another, they typically end up accepting a more extreme version of the views with
which they began (Sunstein, 2003b). This is the process known as group polarization.
Consider a few examples:
•

After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and
its intentions with respect to economic aid (Brown, 1985, p. 224).
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•

A group of moderately profeminist women becomes more strongly profeminist
after discussion (Myers, 1975).

•

After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative
responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced
by African-Americans in American cities (Myers and Bishop, 1971).

•

After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more
positive responses to the same question, that is, they are more likely to find white
prejudice to be the source of conditions faced by African-Americans in American
cities (Myers and Bishop, 1971).

•

Juries inclined to award punitive damages typically produce awards that are
significantly higher than the awards chosen, before deliberation, by their median
member (Sunstein et al., 2002).
Group polarization will inevitably occur in the context of perceptions of risk; and

hence group polarization helps to account for cultural and even national differences. If
several people fear climate change, and speak to one another, their fear is likely to
increase as a result of internal discussions. If some groups seem hysterical about certain
risks, and other groups treat those risks as nonexistent, group polarization is likely to be a
reason. Hence group polarization provides another explanation for the different fears of
groups, localities, and even nations.
Group polarization undoubtedly occurs in connection with climate change;
indeed, it helps explain cross-cultural differences. An initial predisposition toward fear is
likely to be aggravated as a result of collective deliberations. Within groups, a tendency
toward fear or neglect breeds its own amplification. In the United States, group
polarization has played a large role within groups concerned or less concerned about
climate change. Those who believe that the risks are trivial, or not worth addressing,
often speak largely with one another, intensifying their antecedent belief.
7. Media, Interest Groups, and Politicians
It should be clear that in the real world, some voices are more important than
others, especially when availability and salience are involved. In particular, the behavior
and preoccupations of the media play a large role. Knowing the importance of media
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coverage, well-organized private groups work extremely hard to promote public attention
to particular risks. Some of these groups are altruistic; others are entirely self-interested.
The common tactic is to publicize an incident that might trigger both availability
and salience. Showing at least a working knowledge of the availability heuristic, private
groups seize on selected incidents, even ones expected to occur in the future, and
publicize them to make them generally salient to the public. In all of these examples, the
use of particular instances might be necessary to move the public, and legislatures, in the
right directions. Certainly the social processes that interact with salience and availability
can promote reform where it is needed.
Politicians engage in the same basic project. By its very nature, the voice of an
influential politician comes with amplifiers. When public officials bring an incident
before the public, a seemingly illustrative example is likely to spread far and wide. A
legal enactment can itself promote availability; if the law responds to the problems
associated with climate change, people might well come to see those problems as readily
available. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would inevitably loom large no
matter what President George W. Bush chose to emphasize. But the President, and his
White House generally, referred to the attacks on countless occasions, frequently as a
way of emphasizing the reality of seemingly distant threats and the need to incur
significant costs to counteract them (including the 2003 Iraq war, itself fueled by
presidential speeches including vivid narratives of catastrophic harm). And there is no
doubt that the salience of these attacks played a large role in affecting political
behavior—and that this role cannot be understood without reference to social influences.
The implications for cultural differences and for climate change should be clear. If
leaders in different nations draw attention to different risks, there will be large-scale
differences in risk perceptions.
8. Predispositions and Culture
But all this does not provide the full picture. Beliefs and orientations are a product
of availability, and social influences ensure both availability and salience. But as I have
suggested, what is available is also a product of antecedent beliefs and orientations, both
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individual and social. In other words, availability is endogenous to, or a product of,
predispositions, individual, cultural, and national.4
Why do some people recall and emphasize incidents in which a failure to take
precautions led to serious environmental harm? A likely reason is that they are
predisposed to favor environmental protection. And why do some people recall and
emphasize incidents in which environmental protection led to huge costs for little gain? A
likely reason is that they are predisposed to oppose environmental controls. Here is an
interaction between the availability heuristic and confirmation bias—”the tendency to
seek information to confirm our original hypotheses and beliefs” (Aronson, 1995, p. 150).
Confirmation bias plays a large role in different risk perceptions across individuals and
groups. If members of a culturally distinct group are predisposed to believe that climate
change contains serious risks, apparently supportive illustrations will be memorable, and
contrary ones will be discounted.
Of course predispositions are not a black box, and they do not come from the sky.
They have sources. Among their sources are availability and salience. After incidents of
mad cow disease in England, many Europeans lost trust in the relevant authorities and
acquired a predisposition to fear, and to take and urge precautions against, associated and
analogous threats. In Europe, the growth of precautionary thinking, across certain
domains, had a great deal to do with particular salient incidents (Vogel, 2003). The desire
to combat climate change was spurred in this way. Hence there is complex set of
interactions, with heuristics helping to constitute predispositions, which are in turn
responsible for the real-world operation of heuristics. All this happens socially, not
merely individually; and predispositions are not static. When people are in a group that is
predisposed in a particular direction, the salient examples will be quite different from
those that are salient in a group with an opposite predisposition. Here group polarization
is especially important. What is sometimes described as “culture,” or as “deep-rooted
cultural differences,” may be no such thing. Cascade effects and polarization, interacting
with availability, can be responsible for inclinations and variations that might well have
taken another form.
4

On culture, an influential treatment is Douglas and Wildavsky (1984); a natural reading of their work
and the work of those inspired by them is that availability is a product of cultural orientations, rather than
vice versa. But see Vogel (2003) for a contrasting view.
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9. Conclusion
Why are some groups and some nations concerned with the risks associated with
climate change, and why are others much less so? A sensible default assumption is that
they are motivated by a form of intuitive cost-benefit balancing. Nations usually follow
their rational self-interest, and a nation that has relatively less to gain from precautions,
and relatively more to lose, will naturally be interested in greater precautions. Contrast
here the enthusiasm of the United States for precautionary steps to reduce ozone
depletion with the reluctance of the United to endorse such steps to reduce global
warming. The difference has a great deal to do with that nation’s assessment of the costs
and benefits of precautions.
I have also suggested that the operation of the Precautionary Principle, and
differences in risk perception among nations, have a great deal to do with the availability
heuristic, which helps to inform intuitive cost-benefit balancing. For the risks associated
with climate change, which are not likely to come to fruition in the near future, it is
difficult to promote availability; but vivid images are possible to provide here as well.
European nations are more concerned about climate change than the United States in part
because certain environmental risks have become more salient in the former than in the
later, and in part because both intuitive and formal cost-benefit analysis suggest that with
expensive preventive measures, the United States is more likely to be a net loser. If that
analysis shifted, through declining costs of control or through more vivid incidents of
tangible harm, American participation in international agreements would be far more
probable.
Of course availability is a product of social influences. Cascade effects and group
polarization play substantial roles in making one or another incident available to many or
most. There are multiple equilibria here: Single incidents and small shocks can make an
extraordinary difference. Moreover, what is available to some will not be available to all,
in part because of social influences, and in part because of individual, cultural, and
national predispositions. It follows that some cultures will find risks of climate change
“available” not because of simple facts about what citizens have to gain and to lose, but
also because the relevant citizens are predisposed to focus on some risks but not on
others. But even across cultural differences, intuitive cost-benefit balancing can be
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altered by available incidents; if vivid incidents become salient, aggressive regulation is
far more likely to be forthcoming.

References
Aronson, E. (ed.): 1995, Readings about the Social Animal, W.H. Freeman, New York, p. 150.
Behrman, J.R., Kohler, H.P., and Watkins, S.C.: 2003, ‘Social Networks, HIV/AIDS, and Risk
Perceptions’, PIER Working Paper No. 03-007. http://ssrn.com/abstract=382844.
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., and Welch, I.: 1998, ‘Learning from the Behavior of Others:
Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades’, J. Econ. Perspect. 12, 151-170.
Brown, R.: 1985, Social Psychology, Free Press, New York, p. 224.
Burnum, J.F.: 1987, ‘Medical Practice a la Mode: How Medical Fashions Determine Medical
Care’, N. Engl. J. Med. 317, 1220-1222.
Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A.: 1982, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical
and Environmental Dangers, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley.
Feigenson, N., Bailis, D., and Klein, W.: 2005, ‘Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks: A
Cross-national Comparison’, Univ. Missouri L. Rev., forthcoming.
Gigerenzer, G.: 2000, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World, Oxford Univ. Press,
New York.
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M., and ABC Research Group: 1999, Simple Heuristics That Make Us
Smart, Oxford Univ. Press, New York.
Heath, C.,: 1996, ‘Do People Prefer to Pass Along Good or Bad News? Valence and Relevance as
Predictors of Transmission Propensity’, Org. Behav. & Hum. Decis. Process. 68, 79-94.
Heath, C., Bell, C., and Sternberg, E.: 2001, ‘Emotional Selection in Memes: The Case of Urban
Legends’, J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 81, 1028-1041.
Henrich, J., Albers, W., Boyd, R., Gigerenzer, G., McCabe, K.A., Ockenfels, A., and Young,
H.P.: 2001, ‘Group Report: What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?’, in
Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R. (eds.), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, MIT
Press, Cambridge, pp. 343-360.
Hirschleifer, D.: 1995, ‘The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational
Cascades’, in Tommasi, M. and Ierulli, K. (eds.), The New Economics of Human
Behavior, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, pp. 188-216.
Kahneman, D. and Frederick, S.: 2002, ‘Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in
Intuitive Judgment’ in Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D. (eds.), Heuristics and
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, pp.
49-82.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (eds.): 1982, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge and New York.
Kull, S.: 2000, ‘Americans on the Climate change Treaty’, PIPA.
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/GlobalWarming/buenos_aires_02.00.html
Kuran, T. and Sunstein, C.R.: 1999, ‘Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation’, Stan. L. Rev.
51, 683-768.
Loewenstein, G. and Mather, J.: 1990, ‘Dynamic Processes in Risk Perception’, J. Risk & Uncert.
3, 155-175.
Myers, D.G.: 1975, ‘Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization’, Hum. Relat. 28, 699-714
Myers, D.G. and Bishop, G.D.: 1971, ‘The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in Group
Discuission’, J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 20, 386-391.

18

Precautions against What?

Nordhaus, W.D. and Boyer, J.: 2003, Warming the World: Economic Models of Climate change,
MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 161-162.
Pidgeon N., Kasperson, R.F., and and Slovic, P: 2003. The Social Amplification of Risk,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Posner, R.A.: 2004, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Oxford Univ. Press, New York.
Renn, O. and Rohrmann, B. (eds.): 2000, Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical
Studies, Kluwer Academic Publ., Dordrecht and Boston.
The Program on International Policy Attitudes, Americans on the Global Warming Treaty,
available at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/GlobalWarming/glob_warm_treaty.html
at Box 15.
Rohrmann, B. and Renn, O.: 2000, ‘Risk Perception Research: An Introduction’, in Renn, O. and
Rohrmann, B. (eds.), Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies,
Kluwer Academic Publ., Dordrecht and Boston, pp. 11-54.
Sherman, S.J., Cialdini, R.B., Schwartzman, D.F., and Reynolds, K.D.: 2002, ‘Imagining Can
Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating
Effect of Ease of Imagery’, in Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D. (eds.),
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge Univ. Press,
Cambridge and New York, pp. 98-102.
Sjoberg, L., Kolarova, D., and Rucai, A.: 2000, ‘Risk Perception in Bulgaria and Romania’ in
Renn, O. and Rohrmann, B. (eds.), Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of
Empirical Studies, Kluwer Academic Publ., Dordrecht and Boston, pp. 145-184.
Slovic, P.: 2000, The Perception of Risk, Earthscan Publ., London and Sterling, Va., p. 40.
Sunstein, C.R.: 2005, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge Univ. Press,
forthcoming.
Sunstein, C.R.: 2003a, “Beyond the Precautionary Principle’, Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 151, 1003-1058.
Sunstein, C.R.: 2003b, Why Societies Need Dissent, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge.
Sunstein, C.R., Hastie, R., Payne, J.W., Schkade, D.A., Viscusi, W.K.: 2002, Punitive Damages:
How Juries Decide, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.: 2002, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ in
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge and New York, pp. 3-22.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.: 1986, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, in
Arkes, H.R. and Hammond, K.R. (eds.), Judgment and Decision Making: An
Interdisciplinary Reader, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge and New York, pp. 38-55.
Viscusi, W.K. and Hirch, J.: 2005, “The Generational Divide in Support for Climate Change
Policies: European Evidence,” Discussion Paper No. 504, Harvard Law School.
Vogel, D.: 2003, ‘The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and
Environmental regulation in Europe’, Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 33, 557-580.
Wiener, J.B. and Rogers, M.D.: 2002, ‘Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe’, J.
Risk Res. 5, 317-349.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Cass Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
csunstei@uchicago.edu
19

Precautions against What?

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–174 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps (January 2003)
David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short‐Term Assets
(January 2003)
Randal C. Picker, Understanding Statutory Bundles: Does the Sherman Act Come with the 1996
Telecommunications Act? (January 2003)
Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities
and Verizon (January 2003)
William Landes and Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An
Economic Perspective (February 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics (March 2003)
Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks (March 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion (April 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary” History of Property and Liberty (April 2003)
Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost‐Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalizm Is Not an Oxymoron (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (May
2003)
Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective (May 2003)
Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Trade Secrets as Private Property: Their Constitutional Protection (June 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life‐Years, and Willingness to Pay (June 2003)
Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems (July 2003)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Decreasing Liability Contracts (July 2003)
David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs (September
2003)
William L. Meadow, Anthony Bell, and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Memories: What Was the
Standard of Care for Administering Antenatal Steroids to Women in Preterm Labor between 1985
and 2000? (September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage
(September 2003)
Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content (September
2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation (September 2003)
Avraham D. Tabbach, The Effects of Taxation on Income Producing Crimes with Variable Leisure
Time (October 2003)
Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel (October 2003)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003)
David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004)
David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law (April
2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication (February 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of
Statistical Lives (February 2004)

20

Precautions against What?

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Richard A. Epstein, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage; A Critique of the
Institute of Medicine Study (March 2004)
Richard A. Epstein and Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents:
Steady the Course on Hatch‐Waxman (March 2004)
Richard A. Esptein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (April 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute (May 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor
within and between Law Firms (April 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of
Knowledge: Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry (April 2004)
James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market for
Underwriting Business (July 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (July 2004)
Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable (July 2004)
Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, and Cass R. Sunstein, Company Stock,
Market Rationality, and Legal Reform (July 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets
(August 2004, revised October 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross‐Cultural Risk
Perceptions (August 2004)
M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks (August 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Cyber Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope‐of‐Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing
Entry Barriers? (September 2004)
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law (September 2004)
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law (2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost‐Benefit Analysis and the Environment (October 2004)
Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO (October 2004)
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (November 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004)
Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self‐Help (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, Is the International Court of Justice Biased? (December 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and
Remedy (February 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies
(March 2005)
Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law (March 2005)
Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts (March
2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of
Life‐Life Tradeoffs (March 2005)
Alan O. Sykes, Trade Remedy Laws (March 2005)
Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home, and the Duty of
Ongoing Design (March 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic (April 2005)
James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response (May 2005)
Douglas Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard
(May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism (May 2005)

21

Precautions against What?

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Douglas G. Baird, Property, Natural Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of INS v. AP (May 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance
(May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities (July 2005)
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an
Ideal Income Tax (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and
Ingergenerational Equity (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing: A Consumer’s Guide (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (July 2005)
David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting (August 2005)
Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005)
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure (August 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the
Reorganization Bargain (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005)
Arthur J. Jacobson and John P. McCormick, The Business of Business Is Democracy (September
2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost‐Benefit Analysis, and Climate Change
(November 2005)

22

